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Prior research finds that lengthy and boilerplate risk factor disclosures are associated with 
negative capital market consequences. Yet regulators and users of financial statements 
continue to criticize corporate risk factor disclosures as excessively long and boilerplate. We 
investigate two potential sources of firms’ incentives to issue lengthy, boilerplate risk factor 
disclosures by examining how judicial and regulatory assessments of firms’ risk factor 
disclosures correlate with measures of disclosure length and disclosure boilerplate. Our 
results suggest that lengthy and more boilerplate risk factor disclosures are less likely to be 
considered inadequate under judicial and regulatory review. Specifically, risk factor 
disclosures that are lengthier and less specific are less likely to be flagged as inadequate for 
safe harbor purposes under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. In addition, more 
standardized risk factor disclosures are less likely to be targeted by an SEC comment letter 
during the SEC’s filing review process. 
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The SEC mandates that firms disclose the most significant factors that make their stock 
speculative or risky in Item 1A of their periodic SEC filings (SEC 2005). These risk factor 
disclosures also play an important role under current securities laws by providing safe harbor 
protection for firms’ forward-looking disclosures from shareholder lawsuits. Regulatory and 
judicial guidance explicitly warns that firms should avoid lengthy and boilerplate risk disclosure 
in favor of disclosure that is concise and specific to the firm (SEC 2005, SEC 2016, Cong. Rec. 
28 Nov. 1995 13703).  Recent research suggests that firms that deviate from this guidance by 
providing lengthy or boilerplate disclosure experience negative capital market consequences, 
such as higher cost of capital, greater stock price volatility, weaker market responses, and 
declines in analysts’ ability to assess fundamental risk (e.g., Kravet and Muslu 2013; Campbell 
et al. 2014; Hope, Hu, and Lu 2016).  However, practitioners and regulators lament that firms’ 
risk factor disclosures continue to be generic and excessively long (e.g., Johnson 2010; IRRC 
2016; SEC 2016; Berkman 2018). The fact that managers continue to produce lengthy and 
boilerplate disclosures that may expose them to negative capital market consequences suggests 
firms derive some offsetting benefit from this disclosure practice. 
Risk factor disclosures are subject to regulatory assessment under the SEC’s filing review 
process and judicial assessment when federal judges consider whether a sued firm’s forward-
looking statements should be granted safe harbor protections.1 Firms drafting Item 1A risk factor 
disclosures have incentives to minimize their total costs of disclosure, which include not only 
capital market consequences, but also costs arising from regulatory and judicial assessments of 
                                                 
1 Specifically, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995 provides a statutory safe harbor for 
firms’ forward-looking statements accompanied by cautionary language describing the risks that could cause actual 
results to vary from projections. 
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disclosure inadequacy. Thus, even if more concise and firm-specific risk factors provide greater 
clarity to investors, firms may believe lengthy and boilerplate risk factor disclosures help reduce 
their total costs of disclosure by decreasing the likelihood of unfavorable regulatory and judicial 
assessments. In this study, we propose and test the notion that lengthier and more boilerplate risk 
factor disclosures are less likely to be flagged as inadequate under judicial and regulatory review. 
Our investigation of how risk factor disclosure boilerplate and length correlate with the 
likelihood those disclosures will be assessed as inadequate under regulatory or judicial review 
builds on measures of disclosure length and boilerplate introduced by prior literature. Our 
primary measure of risk factor disclosure length is based on a word count of the firm’s Item 1A 
risk factor disclosures, consistent with Campbell et al. (2014). We use two alternative approaches 
developed by prior research to measure risk factor disclosure boilerplate. We argue that each 
measure actually captures a distinct attribute of disclosure that may correlate differently with 
judicial and regulatory assessments of disclosure inadequacy. The first is based on the Stanford 
Named Entity Recognition (NER) tool, which measures the extent to which language is 
inherently specific versus non-specific by counting the number of specific entities named in the 
disclosure (Hope et al. 2016). The second is based on the extent to which language is 
standardized, or used so pervasively among industry peers that it is unlikely to be informative 
(Lang and Stice-Lawrence 2015). Although prior literature has considered both measures to be 
proxies for disclosure “boilerplate,” we focus on the two attributes separately (hereafter non-
specific disclosure and standardized disclosure) to avoid the conflation of these two distinct 
disclosure practices. 
Official regulatory and judicial guidance explicitly indicates risk factor disclosures 
should be concise and tailored to the specific risks faced by the firm, and that “boilerplate” risk 
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disclosures are not sufficient to receive safe harbor protection (SEC 2005; SEC 2016; Cong. Rec. 
28 Nov. 1995 13703).2 If adjudicators adhere to this formal guidance in assessing disclosure 
adequacy, then lengthier, less specific, and more standardized risk disclosure language should be 
more likely to be flagged as inadequate under regulatory and judicial review.  
In spite of this formal guidance, there are a number of reasons that lengthy, non-specific, 
and standardized risk factor disclosures may actually be associated with more favorable judicial 
and regulatory assessments. First, although the PSLRA requires risk factor disclosures to convey 
“substantive” firm-specific information about risks, the PSLRA does not outline how 
“substantive” risk disclosures are identified. Published judicial opinions suggest that disclosure 
length is sometimes relied on as a heuristic for determining substantiveness.3 Second, lengthy 
and non-specific risk factor language may provide greater legal protection if projected results fail 
to materialize, as risk factor disclosures that are more specific and concise inherently cover a 
narrower subset of adverse potential outcomes.  
Third, standardized disclosure may be less likely to be flagged as inadequate because 
regulators and judges use peer firm disclosures to create their own benchmark of what constitutes 
“adequate” or “normal” disclosure. The SEC’s filing review process is conducted by staff with 
specialized industry expertise who review filings for a multitude of peers within the same 
industry.4 Therefore, risk disclosures that are more similar to those of industry peers may be less 
likely to attract regulatory scrutiny. In addition, the legal doctrine of stare decisis (reliance on 
                                                 
2 The Congressional Record is the official daily record of the proceedings and debates occurring in the United States 
Congress (See https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record.). While the congressional record does not carry the 
weight of law, the record provides insight into the purpose for the enactment of laws and courts frequently rely upon 
the congressional record to interpret the law.  
3 For instance, in dismissing a suit against Motorola’s allegedly false and misleading forward-looking statements, 
one judge reasoned that “the risk factors found in Motorola’s SEC 10-K filings are extensive and specific, extending 
beyond eight pages.” 
4 See Division of Corporation Finance: Filing Review Process (SEC), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffilingreview.htm (last updated June 27, 2018). 
4  
  
precedent) can lead judges to consider how closely a given set of risk factor disclosures for a 
sued firm resemble those already assessed as adequate in similar lawsuits.  
Finally, a negative link between standardized language and the likelihood risk disclosures 
are flagged as inadequate may arise if firms adopt standardized peer firm disclosure language 
that has successfully passed judicial or regulatory review to increase the likelihood their own 
disclosures will be considered acceptable (Kahan and Klausner 1997). McMullin (2016) suggests 
that the copying of peer firm disclosure is rampant and that the process of disclosure 
standardization across industry peers is driven by firms sharing a common audit firm.5  
We construct two separate samples to test how risk factor disclosure length, non-
specificity, and standardization correlate with the likelihood risk disclosures are assessed as 
inadequate under judicial or regulatory review. The first consists of judicial decisions ruling on 
firms’ motion to dismiss securities lawsuits that allege false or misleading forward-looking 
statements. We focus on judges’ explicit evaluation of firms’ risk factor language in these 
judicial decisions because these evaluations provide the most direct indication of how risk factor 
attributes relate to safe harbor protections. We read each published judicial decision to determine 
the judge’s assessment of the defendant’s risk factor language as adequate or not for purposes of 
the safe harbor.  To construct our second sample, we use Audit Analytics’ SEC Comment Letter 
database to identify firms that received an SEC comment letter indicating a deficiency in the 
firm’s risk factor disclosures. To better understand the judicial assessment and regulatory 
assessments of risk factor disclosures and motivate our hypotheses, we also identify the reasons 
                                                 
5 Large auditing firms provide disclosure consulting services which include template disclosures based on peer firm 
disclosures for their clients. We spoke with a director of audit and assurance at one of the big four accounting firms 
who stated his firm tags and databases disclosures from Item 1A risk factors as well as other sections of the 10-K to 
use as a reference for aiding client firms to prepare their own disclosures. He indicates his firm also tags and 
databases the comments in SEC comment letters, which allows the firm to model the likelihood their client will 
receive an SEC comment letter based on the client’s disclosures. 
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cited for why the risk factor disclosure was or was not adequate. We find significant variation in 
the rationale judges and the SEC offer to support their assessments of risk factor disclosure 
adequacy, suggesting this determination is far from straightforward. 
Our multivariate regression analyses suggest that the probability a federal judge rules that 
a firm’s risk factor disclosures are inadequate for safe harbor protection is decreasing in 
disclosure length, specificity, and standardization. Including both disclosure specificity and 
standardization in the model reveals that only length and specificity remain statistically 
significant. Together, our results suggest that, conditional on a firm being sued, risk factor 
disclosures are less likely to be assessed as inadequate under judicial review if they are longer 
and less specific. These results are consistent with judges interpreting less specific language as 
covering a broader set of adverse potential outcomes and using length as a heuristic for adequate 
disclosure. Results are robust to controlling for determinants of firm risk, industry affiliation, 
fiscal year, the U.S. circuit in which the firm is headquartered, and the topics discussed in the 
firm’s risk factor disclosures.  
Turning to the SEC comment letter sample, we find a strong negative association between 
our measure of standardized disclosure language and the probability of receiving an SEC 
comment letter related to risk factor disclosures. The finding that standardized risk disclosures 
are negatively associated with the likelihood of being flagged as inadequate by the SEC is 
consistent with the current structure of the SEC, which uses industry specialization of regional 
offices, leading SEC employees to develop a benchmark of adequate disclosure based on 
industry peers.  Overall, our findings suggest that one reason firms may be willing to bear the 
negative capital market consequences of lengthy, non-specific, and standardized risk factor 
disclosures is that these attributes are associated with a lower likelihood of judicial and 
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regulatory assessments of disclosure inadequacy. We run various robustness tests that support 
these main findings. Our main results are robust to alternative approaches to measuring 
disclosure length and standardization and to controlling for the specific topics disclosed in the 
risk factor section. 
Our paper contributes directly to the stream of research examining the quality of firms’ 
risk factor disclosures. Whereas recent research focuses on whether risk factor disclosures 
contain any information content, our study is among the first to propose and test an explanation 
for why lengthy, non-specific, and standardized risk factor disclosure continues to persist despite 
the potential for adverse capital market consequences. Our results suggest that such disclosure 
characteristics may benefit the firm by reducing expected legal and regulatory costs arising from 
judicial and regulatory enforcement.   
These findings also have direct implications for regulators and policy makers seeking to 
understand the forces that shape current risk factor disclosure practices. The evidence we find 
suggests that one reason firms continue to provide lengthy, non-specific, and standardized risk 
factor language is that regulatory and legal outcomes generally do not reward disclosures that are 
concise, specific, and unique-to-the-firm. Our results also suggests that judges and the SEC may 
assess the adequacy of risk factor disclosures in a manner that is inconsistent with official 
guidance.  
2. Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development  
 2.1 CAPITAL MARKET CONSEQUENCES OF RISK FACTOR DISCLOSURE LENGTH AND BOILERPLATE 
 Several recent studies have examined capital market outcomes associated with firms’ 
risk factor disclosures. Kravet and Muslu (2013) find that increases in risk disclosure length is 
associated with subsequent increases in stock return volatility and trading volume and 
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conclude that longer risk disclosures increase investors’ perception of firm risk. Campbell et 
al. (2014) find that increases in risk factor disclosures increase firms’ cost of capital, and 
suggest that this relation may provide strong incentives for managers to resist disclosure. Hope 
et al. (2016) find that more specific disclosures are associated with stronger market responses 
and with greater analyst ability to assess fundamental risk, and concurrent research finds that 
risk factor disclosures can predict firm-specific adverse events (Gaulin 2017). Overall, these 
studies suggest that risk factor disclosures that are less specific (i.e., more boilerplate) and 
lengthier can subject firms to negative capital market consequences.  
Despite the benefits of concise and specific risk disclosure documented by prior 
research, critics allege that risk factor disclosures continue to be excessively boilerplate and 
lengthy (e.g. Johnson 2010; IRRC 2016; SEC 2016; Berkman 2018). Consistent with critics’ 
concerns about the informativeness of risk factor disclosures, Beatty, Cheng, and Zhang (2018) 
report that the market’s response to unexpected 10-K risk factor disclosures has decreased in 
recent years. However, existing research sheds little light on the benefits firms derive from 
lengthy and boilerplate risk factor disclosures that could explain the persistence of these 
attributes. We contribute to this literature by examining how risk factor disclosure length, non-
specificity, and standardization correlate with the likelihood regulators and federal judges will 
flag those risk factor disclosures as inadequate.  
2.2 CAUTIONARY LANGUAGE AND THE PSLRA’S SAFE HARBOR  
Risk factor disclosures play an important role in providing legal protections to firms 
making forward-looking statements. In response to concerns that securities lawsuits were 
discouraging managers from providing useful forward-looking information to investors, 
Congress enacted a safe harbor provision to protect forward-looking statements as part of the 
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Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) (15 U.S.C. § 78u5(c)).6 In order to 
receive the full protection of the PSLRA safe harbor, firms must accompany forward looking 
statements with “meaningful cautionary language” or risk factor disclosure. This safe harbor 
protection often results in the preliminarily dismissal of claims brought by shareholders over 
allegedly false or misleading forward looking statements.7 Conditional on a firm being sued for  
Congress did not explicitly define what makes cautionary language “meaningful”, though 
the statute indicates that cautionary language must identify important risks that could cause 
actual results to vary from projections. The Congressional Conference Report accompanying the 
PSLRA asserts that risk factor disclosures should focus on specific risks, that boilerplate 
cautionary language would not suffice for purposes of the statute’s safe harbor, and that only 
important factors should be listed (Cong. Rec. 28 Nov. 1995 13703). After the SEC began 
mandating the disclosure of firms’ principal risks as Item 1A in their periodic filings starting in 
2005, Item 1A became the primary location for much of the cautionary language firms use to 
invoke safe harbor protection for their forward-looking statements (Nelson and Pritchard 2016). 
Ultimately, whether a firm’s risk factor disclosures are deemed as adequate cautionary language 
depends on judicial interpretation and application of the statutory safe harbor provisions (e.g., 
Olazábal 2000; De Simone, Ingber, and Creutz 2004; Pritchard and Sale 2005; Cornerstone 
                                                 
6 While the PSLRA codified a safe harbor protecting forward looking statements, even prior to the PSLRA a 
common law rule called the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine protected projections and estimates accompanied by 
meaningful cautionary language because misrepresented statements that were accompanied by such warnings were 
deemed to be immaterial. In re Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993); Harris v. IVAX Corp., 998 
F. Supp. 1449, 1454 (S.D. Fla. 1998).  
7 The safe harbor of the PSLRA has two prongs and the first protects forward looking statements that are immaterial 
and statements accompanied by “meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause 
actual results to differ materially” (15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)). Claims based on statements covered by the first 
prong are typically dismissed by courts on preliminary motion without inquiry into the state of mind of the firm that 
made the statement. In the absence of such cautionary statements, lesser protections may apply under the second 
prong that permits an inquiry into the state of mind of the firm making the statement (15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)). 
The second prong protections are more similar to the weaker general PSLRA protections for non-forward looking 
statements and potentially opens the firm up to costly discovery proceedings.    
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2016). Thus, we focus on explicit judicial assessments of firms’ risk factor disclosures to provide 
direct insight into how risk factor disclosure properties relate to safe harbor protections. 
In order to gain institutional insight into the factors that judges claim influence their 
assessments of risk factor disclosure adequacy and to guide the development of our hypotheses, 
we read over five hundred judicial opinions published between 1996 and 2015 relating to 
defendants’ request to dismiss securities lawsuits that allege false or misleading forward-looking 
statements. We find that in over eighty percent of these decisions, the judge makes an explicit 
ruling over the firms’ cautionary language as either adequate or inadequate to avail the firm’s 
forward-looking statements of safe harbor protection. Next, we categorize the judges’ rationale 
and tabulate in Table 1 the reasons cited by judges to support their rulings.   
Panel A indicates that the extent to which risk factor language is boilerplate versus firm-
specific is commonly cited as a factor influencing judicial assessments of risk factor disclosure 
adequacy. However, consistent with similar views expressed by legal scholars (Bloomenthal and 
Wolff 2012), our reading of the underlying judicial opinions suggests many of these assessments 
are largely ad hoc and are not based on any standard, objective benchmark of what constitutes 
sufficient specificity. For instance, Panel A of Table 1 indicates that several judges explicitly 
consider how similar a firm’s risk factor disclosures are to risk disclosures that were considered 
adequate by prior courts. This practice is consistent with the legal doctrine of stare decisis, 
which binds judges to uphold precedents set in prior cases. In one case, a federal court granted a 
favorable ruling of risk factor disclosure adequacy because the firm’s disclosure was “virtually 
identical to language approved by the Ninth Circuit in instances in which forward-looking 
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statements were immunized by the PSLRA Safe Harbor.”8 Firms’ adoption of risk factor 
language that has been vetted by prior courts could lead to more standardized risk factor 
language that is less likely to be considered inadequate under subsequent judicial review. We 
formalize the association between standardized risk factor disclosures and judicial assessments 
of inadequacy as our first hypothesis, stated in null form: 
H1a: There is no association between risk factor disclosure standardization and the 
likelihood risk factor disclosures will be deemed inadequate for purposes of the 
PSLRA’s safe harbor.   
 
The most common factor cited by judges ruling that risk factors are adequate is that the 
disclosure simply fulfils the requirement to warn investors of risks that could cause actual results 
to vary. The most commonly cited reason for why risk factor language is inadequate is the firm’s 
omission of a material risk factor. Because specific risk factor disclosures inherently cover a 
narrower subset of potential adverse outcomes, it is possible that less specific risk factor 
disclosures provide superior legal protection. These considerations suggest that even generic risk 
factor disclosures may be adequate to avail firms of safe harbor protection. 9 
Consistent with this notion, one partner at a national law firm recently asserted that all 
10-Ks contain boilerplate risk factor language to make such factors “as all-encompassing as 
possible” (see Berkman 2018). This incentive may help explain Hope et al.’s (2016) finding that 
Item 1A risk factor disclosures are less specific than other sections of the 10-K. Thus, despite 
legislative guidance that risk factors should be firm-specific, the actual association between risk 
                                                 
8 In Re Fusion-IO, Inc. Securities litigation, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18304; see also Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 
Union No. 630 Pension-Annuity Trust Fund v. Allscripts-Misys Healthcare Solutions, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 858 
(2011).  
9 Bloomenthal and Wolff (2012) questioned whether the 7th circuit court correctly identified boilerplate language in 
determining the adequacy of risk factor disclosures in the case Asher v. Baxter International, Inc., 377 F.3d 717 (7th 
Cir. 2004) because such disclosures, although deemed adequate by the court, appeared to “cover as many 
conceivable generic factors that could relate to the company’s business as possible.” 
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factor specificity and judicial assessments of adequacy is unclear. We formalize the tension in 
the relationship between risk factor specificity and the likelihood risk factors are flagged as 
inadequate for purposes of the PSLRA’s safe harbor as our next hypothesis, stated in null form as 
follows: 
H1b: There is no association between risk factor disclosure specificity and the 
likelihood risk factor disclosures will be deemed inadequate for purposes of the 
PSLRA’s safe harbor.   
 
The PSLRA and its supporting legislative guidance indicate that only important risk factor 
disclosures entitle firms to safe harbor protections. However, there are a number of reasons that 
longer risk factor disclosures may provide superior legal protection.  First, judges may view 
lengthier risk factor disclosures as better fulfilling the PSLRA’s requirement that risk factor 
disclosures convey “substantive” information about the risks that could cause actual results to 
vary. Panel A of Table 1 indicates that judges sometimes cite the length of a firm’s risk factor 
disclosures as supporting evidence for their assertion that the firm’s cautionary language was 
adequate. Second, uncertainty regarding which risks are most important may lead assessors of 
risk disclosure adequacy to view lengthier risk factor disclosures as representing a good faith 
effort to warn of all potentially material risks the firm may face. Third, the inclusion of a longer 
list of risk factor disclosures helps ensure no obvious omissions have been made. Given that the 
congressional record and some evidence from our reading of judicial opinions may be at odds 
with one another, we formalize our next hypothesis in null form as follows: 
H1c: There is no association between risk factor disclosure length and the likelihood 
risk factor disclosures will be deemed inadequate for purposes of the PSLRA’s safe 




2.3 THE SEC’S ITEM 1A RISK FACTOR DISCLOSURE MANDATE  
In 2005, the SEC began mandating disclosure of firms’ most significant risk factors in 
Item 1A of firms’ periodic filings to help investors understand the nature of the risk inherent in 
the company. Prior to 2005, any cautionary language that firms provided for purposes of the 
PSLRA’s safe harbor was not consistently reported in any particular section of firms’ periodic 
filings. SEC reporting requirements stipulate that Item 1A risk factor disclosures should avoid 
vague boilerplate (17 C.F.R. 230.421(b)) and be clear, concise, and tailored to the specific risks 
facing the reporting firm (e.g., SEC 2004; SEC 2005).   
The SEC reviews Item 1A risk factor disclosures, along with firms’ other periodic filings, 
as part of its filing review process. Firms whose risk factor disclosures are non-compliant with 
disclosure guidelines may receive SEC comment letters asking them to rectify the perceived 
deficiency. The SEC states it “concentrates its review resources on disclosures that appear to be 
inconsistent with Commission rules or applicable accounting standards, or that appear to be 
materially deficient in their rationale or clarity.” The SEC Division of Corporate Finance’s 11 
offices possess industry-specific accounting and disclosure expertise and manage the review of 
filings of firms in these industries.10   
The SEC’s review of Item 1A risk factor disclosures varies in important respects from 
judicial review of risk factor disclosures to determine disclosure adequacy. Perhaps most 
importantly, the SEC is under no obligation to explicitly rule on the adequacy of risk factor 
disclosures that it reviews. Rather, the SEC only sends comment letters relating to risk factor 
disclosures if it identifies a perceived deficiency. Thus, no observable documentation exists 
regarding the SEC’s assessments when risk factor disclosures are deemed to be adequate for 
                                                 
10 See https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffilingreview htm (accessed on March 20, 2018).  
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regulatory compliance. To identify the specific disclosure deficiencies the SEC asks firms to 
rectify and to guide the development of our hypotheses, we read a randomly selected sample of 
two hundred SEC comment letters identified by Audit Analytics as relating to firms’ risk factor 
disclosures. Based on our reading, we identified six separate categories of comments and tabulate 
them as Panel B in Table 1. Because the SEC may have multiple comments relating to risk factor 
disclosures within a single comment letter, the total number of comments tabulated in Panel B 
exceeds two hundred. Panel B indicates that the SEC often requests firms to clarify, expand, and 
occasionally reduce risk factor disclosures.  
Although SEC comment letters often solicit additional information about the firm’s own 
risks, it is possible that risk factor disclosures that more closely mirror industry peers’ risks are 
less likely to attract regulatory scrutiny in the first place incident to the structure of the SEC’s 
process. The SEC’s filing review process is conducted by staff who review filings for a large 
number of firms within the same industry, and as such the reviewing staff may be less likely to 
challenge risk disclosures that look similar to those of industry peers.  Recent research suggests 
that firms preparing their own disclosures often look to peer firm disclosures to form their own 
expectation of what constitutes adequate disclosure, and that borrowing language from industry 
peers’ disclosures is common (e.g., McMullin 2016, Berkman 2018; see also Brown, Tian, and 
Tucker 2017). This process is likely facilitated by large audit firms’ statutory reporting and 
disclosure assistance services, which provide financial reporting templates for their clients based 
on their knowledge of the types of disclosures that were flagged as inadequate by regulators in 
the past.  
Thus, despite the SEC’s formal guidance that risk factor disclosures should be tailored to 
the firm, it is possible that more standardized risk factor language is less likely to attract 
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regulatory attention. We formalize the tension in the relationship between standardized risk 
factor disclosures and the likelihood of an SEC comment letter as our next hypothesis, stated in 
null form as follows:  
 H2a: There is no association between risk factor disclosure standardization and the 
likelihood risk factor disclosures will be deemed inadequate under the SEC’s filing 
review process.  
  
Panel B of Table 1 indicates that lack of specificity is the most frequently addressed issue 
in SEC comment letters relating to risk factor disclosures, suggesting that firms with more 
specific risk factor language may avoid receiving a comment letter from the SEC. However, 
there are at least two reasons that a lack of disclosure specificity may not lead to a greater 
likelihood of receiving an SEC comment letter in the first place. First, the SEC may use other 
filtering mechanisms, such as the extent to which a firm’s risk disclosures vary from those of 
industry peers, to select risk disclosures for further investigation. In that case, the SEC’s 
solicitation for greater specificity in risk disclosures is only conditional on, and not a driver of, 
the decision to issue the comment letter. 
Second, the SEC’s formal disclosure guidance requires firms to be concise while still 
disclosing the most significant risks that make their offering speculative or risky (SEC 2005). 
Because less specific risk factor language inherently covers a broader set of adverse potential 
outcomes concisely than does more specific language, disclosures that describe risks in less 
specific terms may be less likely to initially attract the SEC’s attention.  We consider the 
association between risk factor specificity and the likelihood risk factor disclosures are targeted 
by an SEC comment letter in our next hypothesis, stated in null form:  
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H2b: There is no association between risk factor disclosure specificity and the 
likelihood risk factor disclosures will be deemed inadequate under the SEC’s filing 
review process.  
 
Although SEC guidance cautions firms to make risk factors concise, lengthier risk factor 
disclosure may decrease the likelihood regulators will observe an obvious omission that could 
spawn further scrutiny. The descriptive evidence in Panel B of Table 1 suggests the SEC is more 
likely to request a firm to lengthen its risk factor disclosures rather than remove an existing 
factor. In 57 of the comment letters, the firm was asked to add an additional risk factor. In 40 
comment letters the firm was asked to remove “qualifying language” and in only 7 cases did the 
SEC ask the firm to remove an existing risk factor. Thus, how risk factor disclosure length 
relates to the probability risk factor disclosures are targeted by the SEC is an open empirical 
question. We formulate our final hypotheses in null form as follows: 
 H2c: There is no association between risk factor disclosure length and the likelihood 
risk factor disclosures will be deemed inadequate under the SEC’s filing review 
process.  
 
3. Sample Construction   
Our analysis of judicial and regulatory assessments of firms’ risk factor disclosures 
requires the construction of two distinct samples. The first sample consists of firms whose risk 
factor disclosures were assessed for adequacy by judges making safe harbor determinations 
during the dismissal phase of securities class action lawsuits. We search the Lexis Advance legal 
database for all published judicial opinions relating to the motion to dismiss securities litigation 
alleging false or misleading forward-looking statements between 2006 and 2015. Keyword 
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searches retrieved an initial judicial opinion sample for 328 securities lawsuits that we were able 
to match with lawsuit data from Stanford’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse database.11   
We eliminate several cases due to missing Compustat or CRSP data and cases where 
either the judge determined the statements were not forward-looking or failed to explicitly rule 
on the adequacy of the cautionary language. Our procedure for selecting this sample is detailed in 
Panel A of Table 2. Ultimately, our regression analyses examining judicial assessments of risk 
factor disclosure are based on a sample of 144 distinct lawsuits in which the judge explicitly 
rules regarding the adequacy of the firm’s cautionary language.   
We measure the judicial assessment of risk factor disclosure adequacy for each lawsuit 
and the boilerplate for the Item 1A Risk Factor disclosures in the firm’s 10-K filed during the 
lawsuit’s class period.12 Because the class period of some lawsuits includes more than one year, 
our final sample for our main analysis of judicial assessments includes 231 unique firm-years 
corresponding to 231 unique 10-K filings made during the class period.    
Our second sample consists of firm-years in which a firm received an SEC comment 
letter relating to at least one Item 1A risk factor disclosure between 2005 and 2015. We use 
Audit Analytics’ SEC Comment Letter database to construct this sample. As illustrated in Panel 
B of Table 2, we begin with an initial sample of 4,450 firm-years for which Audit Analytics 
indicates the corresponding SEC filings were the target of a comment letter relating to risk 
factors. After eliminating firm-years for which Item 1A Risk Factor disclosures were not 
retrievable from the SEC website, firm-years for which textual analysis variables could not be 
                                                 
11 Our initial search includes securities cases between 1996 and 2015 with judicial opinions that use the following 
phrases: “risk factor,” “cautionary language,” and “safe harbor.” This search returned over 500 cases. This sample is 
reduced to 328 align the time period with the presence of Item 1A (2006-2015). 
12 In some cases, the class period did not include a 10-K filing date. In these cases, we selected the 10-K filed 
immediately prior to the start of the class period.  
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computed from the extracted Item 1A disclosure, and firm-years missing necessary CRSP or 
Compustat data, we are left with a final sample of 1,607 firm-years for which risk factor 
disclosures were the target of an SEC comment letter in the following year. We use this same 
dataset to identify firm-years in which a firm did not receive an SEC comment letter relating to 
risk factor disclosures to form a control sample. After identifying these firms, our final sample 
for the SEC comment letter analysis includes a total of 33,725 firm-years.    
4. Variable Measurement  
4.1 MEASURING JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY ASSESSMENT OF RISK FACTOR INADEQUACY  
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c center on the likelihood risk factor disclosures will be ruled 
inadequate under judicial review as a function of risk language standardization, specificity, and 
length. To code our dependent variable for these analyses, we identify risk factor disclosures 
deemed inadequate under judicial review by reading each opinion in our sample of lawsuits and 
determining whether the judge assesses the firm’s cautionary language as sufficient to avail itself 
of the PSLRA’s safe harbor. We set the indicator variable RF_INADEQUATE_JG equal to one 
for firm-years in class periods in which the cautionary language was ultimately deemed 
inadequate by the judge, and zero for firm-years in class periods for which the judge ruled the 
cautionary language adequate.   
Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c consider the probability risk factor disclosures will be flagged 
as inadequate under regulatory review as a function of risk language standardization, specificity, 
and length. We use the SEC’s decision to issue a risk factor-related comment letter as a proxy for 
the SEC’s assessment that the firm’s risk factor disclosure was inadequate.  We set the indicator 
variable RF_INADEQUATE_SEC equal to one if a firm-year’s risk factor disclosures were 
targeted by an SEC comment letter, and zero otherwise. We use Audit Analytics’ Comment 
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Letter database to identify firms that received comment letters relating to their risk factor 
disclosures in the 10-K filing for any given year.   
Our objective in testing our hypotheses is to capture the association between risk factor 
disclosure characteristics and judicial or regulatory assessments of risk factor disclosure 
adequacy, holding constant the firm’s underlying risks, industry affiliation, headquarter location, 
and fiscal year. We next discuss our measure of disclosure standardization, specificity, and 
length, as well as the construction of each of our control variables.  
4.2 MEASURES OF DISCLOSURE LENGTH AND BOILERPLATE  
Prior literature has examined two measures of “boilerplate” that reflect distinct disclosure 
practices that cause disclosures to convey less firm-specific information. The first measure 
captures the extent to which disclosure language is so standardized that it is unlikely to be 
informative (e.g., Lang and Stice-Lawrence 2015). To capture firms’ use of standardized 
language in their risk factor disclosure, we first identify commonly used trigrams (3-word 
phrases) in risk factor disclosure sentences for all firms in the same two-digit SIC industry. Next, 
we identify standardized sentences as those that either use 10 or more of these commonly used 
trigrams or for which 10 percent or more of the trigrams in the sentence are commonly used. We 
then count the number of words in these standardized sentences and divide this number by the 
total number of words in the risk factor section. Our approach to measuring this variable, which 
we label STANDARDIZATION, is similar to the approached used by Lang and Stice-Lawrence 
(2015) to measure boilerplate in annual reports of non-US firms.   
The second measure of “boilerplate” is based on the Stanford Named Entity Recognition 
(NER) tool that determines the extent to which specific entities are discussed in the disclosure 
(e.g., Hope et al. 2016). This measure captures the extent to which disclosures are more or less 
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specific based on the inherent precision of the language. Following Hope et al. (2016), we use a 
computing algorithm to identify words that specifically describe an entity (name or numeric 
expression), and count the number of specific entities described in a firm’s risk factor section. 
We scale this word count by the total number of words in the risk factor section to adjust for 
differences in the length of this disclosure across firms. We label this measure 
NON_SPECIFICITY. 13 Because we are interested in examining the effects of specificity after 
controlling for determinants of the underlying disclosure, we benchmark this measure against 
that of each firm’s most similar industry peer. Each firm’s most similar industry peer is based on 
the similarity of the two firms’ 10-K Item 1 Business Description disclosure. Details of this 
matching procedure can be found in the Appendix.  
We measure Item 1A risk factor disclosure length based on the total number of words, 
consistent with how disclosure volume is measured by a host of prior studies (e.g., Li 2008; You 
and Zhang 2009; Miller 2010; Lawrence 2013; Campbell et al 2014). LENGTH is the natural 
logarithm of the number of words in the Item 1A risk factor disclosure in the firm-year’s 10-K. 
Because we are interested in examining the association between risk factor disclosure length and 
judicial and regulatory assessments of adequacy after holding other determinants of disclosure 
constant, we also benchmark this variable against the most similar industry peer. 
4.3 CONTROL VARIABLES  
  We include several control variables that may confound the relationship between risk 
factor disclosure attributes and adjudicators’ assessments of risk factor disclosure adequacy. 
First, we include the correlation of firms’ stock returns and industry peer firm stock returns to 
                                                 
13 Untabulated analyses indicate that NON_SPECIFICITY and STANDARDIZATION have only a 22 percent 
correlation. Thus, although these two variables capture related constructs, the underlying disclosure behaviors are 
distinct.   
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control for the fact that firms with similar underlying economic events may adopt similar 
language to describe for those events. RET_COR is the mean correlation between each firm’s 24-
month return ending at the end of the current fiscal year and that of its 2-digit SIC industry peers.  
We also construct several measures of firm risk that may influence firms’ risk factor disclosures 
as well as adjudicators’ assessments of disclosure adequacy. RET_VOL is the standard deviation 
of daily returns for the year ending two days prior to the 10-K filing date. BETA is the firm’s 
market beta measured using daily returns for the one year ending two trading days prior to the 
10-K filing date. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity.  LEV is total 
liabilities scaled by total assets, measured as of the end of the fiscal year. BIG_N is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm is audited by one of the largest auditors (the Big N), and zero 
otherwise.  SKEW is measured as the negative coefficient of skewness for daily returns over the 
year ending two days prior to the 10-K filing date.  TURNOVER is the mean number of shares 
traded during the fiscal year scaled by the number of common shares outstanding. ETR is the 
firm’s effective tax rate, computed as tax expense scaled by pre-tax income. ROE is income 
before extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity. We include various fixed effects 
to control for industry affiliation, fiscal year, and the U.S. circuit in which each firm is 
headquartered because research indicates judicial practices and litigation risk sometimes vary by 
circuit (Hopkins 2018; Cazier, Christensen, Merkley, Treu 2018).14 In some specifications we 
also include controls for the actual topics discussed in the firm’s risk factor disclosures (See 
                                                 
14 We measure industry affiliation at the 2-digit SIC level for the SEC comment letter analysis. Because of the 
relatively small sample size in the lawsuit sample, we measure industry affiliation at the Fama-French 12 industry 
classification level for those tests to maintain a practical number of degrees of freedom 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken french/Data_Library/det_12_ind_port.html).  
21  
  
Appendix B for construction of these risk topic controls) however, these controls are excluded 
from the main specification to avoid overfitting concerns   
Equation 1 below shows the form of our primary regression model:  
Pr(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡) = β0 + β1STANDARDIZED𝑖,𝑡 + β2NON_SPECIFICITY𝑖,𝑡 +  
β3LENGTH𝑖,𝑡   + β4RET_COR𝑖,𝑡   + β5RET_VOL𝑖,𝑡   + β6BETA𝑖,𝑡 + β7SIZE𝑖,𝑡   + β8LEV𝑖,𝑡   +  
β9BIG_N𝑖,𝑡   + β10SKEWNEWSS𝑖,𝑡   + β11TURNOVER𝑖,𝑡   + β12ETR𝑖,𝑡   + β13ROE𝑖,𝑡 + Industry 
controls + Circuit controls + Year controls + Topic controls + ε𝑖,𝑡                 (1)   
4.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Table 3 presents sample means for each of our independent variables of interest. Panel A 
displays the descriptive statistics for our sample of firms sued for false or misleading forward-
looking statements. Panel B displays the descriptive statistics for firm-years in our comment 
letter analysis. We note that our variables do not appear to exhibit extreme skewness, as the mean 
for each continuous variable is within the inner-quartile range in nearly every case. To mitigate 
the effects of extreme outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.   
5. Empirical Results  
5.1 JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT OF RISK FACTOR DISCLOSURE ADEQUACY  
Our first set of hypotheses focuses on judicial assessments of risk factor disclosure 
inadequacy. To substantiate the notion that judicial assessments of risk factor disclosure 
inadequacy are associated with costly legal outcomes and to validate our measurement of 
RF_INADEQUATE_JG, we first estimate a logistic regression of the likelihood of lawsuit 
dismissal as a function RF_INADEQUATE_JG and control variables. Column 1 of Table 4 
displays results from estimating this regression over the entire sample period 1996 to 2015. 
Column 2 of Table 4 re-estimates this regression only on post-2005 observations for which we 
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have Item 1A data. Both columns report a significantly negative coefficient on 
RF_INADEQUATE_JG (p < 0.01), confirming that a ruling of risk factor disclosure inadequacy 
for purposes of the safe harbor imposes significant costs for defendant firms. 
Results from modeling judicial assessments of risk factor disclosure adequacy as a 
function of Item 1A standardization, specificity, and length are reported in Table 5. In the first 
column of Table 5, we present results from including LENGTH as the only risk factor disclosure 
attribute and find a significantly negative (p < 0.05) relationship between risk factor disclosure 
length and the likelihood risk factor disclosures will be ruled as inadequate for purposes of the 
safe harbor. In the second column of Table 5, we replace LENGTH with NON_SPECIFICITY 
and find it also has a significantly negative coefficient estimate (p < 0.05), suggesting that risk 
factor disclosures containing less specific language are less likely to be assessed as inadequate by 
judges for purposes of safe harbor protections. 15 Re-estimating this model after replacing 
NON_SPECIFICITY with STANDARDIZATION produces the results displayed in the third 
column of Table 5, which show no significant association between the extent to which risk factor 
disclosures use standardized language and the likelihood risk factor disclosures are flagged as 
inadequate under judicial review.  
The last column of Table 5 presents results after including all three risk disclosure 
attributes together, along with indicator variables controlling for the topics discussed in the 
firm’s risk factor disclosure. Results indicate that even after controlling for disclosure content, 
NON_SPECIFICITY has a strong negative association (p < 0.01) with the likelihood risk factor 
                                                 
15 Stanford’s NER tool identifies entities in seven categories, three of which refer to proper nouns (persons, 
organizations, and locations), and four of which refer to numeric values (time, money, percent, and date). In 
untabulated analyses, we split the NON_SPECIFICITY variable into the portion made of proper nouns versus 




disclosures are deemed inadequate for safe harbor purposes. LENGTH continues to be negatively 
associated with the likelihood risk disclosures are ruled inadequate, though the inclusion of the 
specific topic indicators attenuates the statistical significance of this relationship. We note that 
when estimating this regression without topic indicators, the coefficient estimate on LENGTH is 
negative and strongly significant (p < 0.01) and the coefficient estimate on NON_SPECIFICITY 
is significant at the 5% level. 
 Results in Table 5 suggest that, despite the caution expressed in the congressional record 
and by courts that risk factor disclosure should be specific and concise, less specific and lengthy 
risk factor disclosure correlates with more favorable judicial outcomes. These results are 
consistent with the view that lengthy and non-specific risk factor disclosure may provide greater 
legal protection by covering a broader set of potentially adverse events and, as occasionally 
expressed in judicial opinions, that relatively generic language can meet the requirements of the 
statute.  
To provide a sense of the economic magnitude of our results, we compute the mean 
marginal effects for the two explanatory variables of interest that load significantly in the last 
column of Table 5. Untabulated marginal effects suggest that going from the first quartile to the 
third quartile of LENGTH decreases the probability risk factor disclosures are ruled as inadequate 
under judicial review by 7.6 percent. The probability a firm’s risk factor disclosures are ruled 
inadequate under judicial review decreases by 13.7 percent as those disclosures move from the 
first to the third quartile of NON_SPECIFICITY. This evidence suggests one reason firms may 
continue to issue lengthy and non-specific risk factor disclosures is to benefit from an increased 
likelihood of being granted safe harbor protection.  
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5.2 REGULATORY ASSESSMENT OF RISK FACTOR DISCLOSURE ADEQUACY  
  Panel A of Table 6 presents results from estimating equation 1 on our sample of firms for 
our SEC comment letter analysis. We replace the dependent variable with 
RF_INADEQUATE_SEC, which is an indicator variable equal to one in firm-years if the firm 
receives an SEC comment letter relating to their Item 1A risk factor disclosures. The ordering of 
results in Table 6 parallels that in Table 5. The first column of Panel A indicates that LENGTH is 
not significantly associated with the likelihood of receiving an SEC comment letter relating to 
risk factor disclosures. The second column shows a negative and marginally significant (p < 
0.10) coefficient estimate on NON_SPECIFICITY, providing modest support for the notion that 
SEC comment letters are less likely to target risk factor language that is less specific. The third 
column of Panel A reveals a strongly negative (p < 0.01) coefficient estimate on 
STANDARDIZATION, suggesting the SEC is significantly less likely to issue comment letters 
relating to risk factor disclosures when those disclosures use language that is pervasive in 
industry peers’ disclosures. The final column of Panel A displays results from estimating this 
model with all three risk factor disclosure variables included, along with indicator variables 
capturing the topics discussed in the risk disclosure. Results indicate only STANDARDIZATION 
is significantly associated with the likelihood of receiving an SEC comment letter in this 
specification. 
An analysis of marginal effects suggests that the association between standardized 
language (STANDARDIZATION) and the probability of an SEC comment letter targeting risk 
factor disclosures is relatively modest. Going from the first quartile to the third quartile of 
STANDARDIZATION from Model 4 of Panel A in Table 6 decreases the probability of an SEC 
letter by only approximately 0.5 percent. However, results from Panel A do suggest that, despite 
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the SEC’s frequent admonition to tailor risk factor disclosures to the specific risk factors faced 
by the firm, risk factor language that more closely resembles that of industry peers is less likely 
to be flagged as inadequate under regulatory review.   
5.3 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 One potential limitation of the sample examined in Panel A of Table 6 is that not all firms 
undergo the SEC filing review process each year. The SEC reviews filings of every publicly 
traded firm at least every three years, with some firms’ filings being reviewed more frequently. 
However, the SEC does not reveal its formula for determining which firms to review more 
frequently, and in the absence of a comment letter, we cannot discern which firms were under 
review each year. To test the sensitivity of the results in Panel A of Table 6, we rerun our 
estimation only on firms that received at least one SEC comment letter during the year to ensure 
our sample includes only firms whose filings were actually under review. We tabulate results 
from this sample, which includes 13,419 firm-year observations, in Panel B of Table 6. We find 
the association between STANDARDIZATION and RF_INADEQUATE_JG to be qualitatively 
and quantitatively similar to those reported in Panel A, providing further support for the view 
that the likelihood risk factor disclosures are targeted by an SEC comment letter is decreasing in 
disclosure boilerplate. We continue to find no association between LENGTH and the likelihood 
of an SEC comment letter. 
  A second potential limitation of the results in Panel A of Table 6 is that we rely on Audit  
Analytics’ comment letter database to identify comment letters relating to Item 1A risk factor 
disclosures. Our reading of a significant subsample of the SEC comment letters relating to risk 
factors as identified by Audit Analytics indicates that the majority (approximately 75%) relate to 
Item 1A risk factor disclosures. However, we find that a significant minority of SEC comment 
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letters that Audit Analytics indicates as relating to “risk factors” do not directly relate to Item 1A 
Risk Factor disclosures, which potentially induces noise or even bias in our main analyses. To 
examine the impact of this potential bias in our sample, we test the sensitivity of our results to an 
alternative method of identifying comment letters relating to Item 1A risk factors. We use a 
regular expression to measure an alternative variable equal to one if the SEC comment letter 
includes the text “Item 1A,” and zero otherwise. We find this alternative indicator variable to be 
45 percent correlated with RF_INADEQUATE_SEC. We report results from estimating equation 
(1) after substituting this variable as the dependent variable in Panel C of Table 6. Results in the 
second and third columns of Panel C indicate that both NON_SPECIFICITY and 
STANDARDIZATION are significantly negatively associated with the likelihood of receiving an 
SEC comment letter related to Item 1A risk factor disclosures. However, results in the last 
column of Panel C suggest that when both STANDARDIZATION and NON_SPECIFICITY are 
both included in the model, only STANDARDIZATION has a significantly negative coefficient 
estimate (p < 0.05). We continue to find no evidence of an association between risk factor 
disclosure length and the likelihood of an SEC comment letter. 
We next examine the sensitivity of our results to alternative cutoffs to identify boilerplate 
trigrams and sensitives to measure STANDARDIZATION. Our original construction of this 
variable in our main analyses defines boilerplate sentences as those with at least 10% of all 
trigrams in the sentence being boilerplate trigrams, where boilerplate trigrams are those 
appearing in at least 10% of all Item 1A disclosures in the same 2-digit SIC industry on average, 
but not in more than 90% of all industry peers’ Item 1A disclosures. We test the robustness of 
our results to alternative cutoffs and report the results in Table 7. The first column of Table 7 
(Model 1) displays results after changing those cutoffs to 20%, 20%, and 80%, respectively. The 
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second column of Table 7 (Model 2) displays results after changing those cutoffs to 25%, 25%, 
and 75%, respectively. Under both alternative sets of cutoffs, STANDARDIZATION continues to 
have a strong negative association (p < 0.01) with the likelihood of an SEC comment letter. 
The SEC has repeatedly admonished firms to avoid risk factor language that could apply 
to any issuer. We next examine results from the SEC comment letter analysis after broadening 
our measure of STANDARDIZATION to include trigram similarity with all firms in the economy 
rather than those in just the same industry. The resulting measure of standardized language 
arguably captures greater reliance on extremely generic risk factor disclosure language. We 
apply the original cutoffs (10%, 10%, and 90%) to our construction of STANDARDIZATION 
where these percentages apply to trigrams used in all Item 1A risk factors in our sample, rather 
than those only in the same 2-digit SIC industry and report results in the last column of Table 7. 
We find this variable does not correlate significantly with the probability of receiving an SEC 
comment letter. In untabulated analyses, we fail to find any association between market-wide 
measures of standardized language based on any alternative cutoffs and the likelihood of an SEC 
comment letter. Overall, our results suggest the SEC does not look favorably or unfavorably 
upon risk factor language that is so broad that it could apply to any issuer, though the SEC 
appears to reward firms using risk factor language that is pervasively used by firms within the 
same industry.16   
We emphasize that the negative correlation between industry-level standardized risk 
factor language and SEC comment letters holds after controlling for the actual underlying risk 
factor topics disclosed. In untabulated analyses, we also include a control variable that measures 
the cosine similarity between a firm’s risk factor topic probability vector of each firm’s risk 
                                                 
16 We emphasize that our results hold after including controls for the actual underlying risk factor topics being 
disclosed. In untabulated analyses, we also find the negative relationship between 
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factors with those of its industry peers. Results are consistent with STANDARDIZATION being 
associated with a lower likelihood of risk-related SEC common letters, even after controlling for 
the similarity of disclosed risk topics. These results appear to be inconsistent with the SEC’s 
admonition for firms to tailor their risk factor language to reflect the specific risks faced by the 
firm. 
Finally, we test the robustness of our results to an alternative measure of risk factor 
disclosure length proposed by Campbell et al (2014). This alternative measure of length is based 
on the natural logarithm of a word count of specific risk-related words identified in their study. 
To test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of this alternative measure of the length of 
risk disclosures, we rerun our main analyses using this measure in place of LENGTH. We find 
that this measure also correlates significantly (p < 0.05) with the probability risk factor 
disclosures will be ruled as inadequate under judicial review, and that this variable has a 
marginally significant negative correlation with the likelihood of receiving an SEC comment 
letter (p<0.10). 
6. Conclusion  
  Despite official reporting requirements from the SEC that Item 1A risk factor disclosures 
should be specific and tailored to the reporting firm, practitioners and regulators continue to 
lament that these disclosures are boilerplate and uninformative. Whereas other academic studies 
document risk factor disclosures convey some information to the market and the use of lengthy 
boilerplate disclosures result in negative capital market consequences, our study is among the 
first to propose and test an explanation for why firms continue to provide lengthy and boilerplate 
disclosures.  Specifically, we provide evidence that firms may benefit from using lengthy, non-
specific and standardized risk factor disclosures by avoiding unfavorable regulatory or judicial 
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outcomes. Our results provide insight that may inform policy makers and standard setters 
regarding how legal standards and SEC mandates are implemented in practice. Our results 
highlight a potential disconnect between formal regulatory and legislative disclosure guidance 
and how that guidance is enforced via regulatory and judicial outcomes.  
  The results from our study are subject to certain caveats. For instance, we note that the 
correlation we document between boilerplate and the likelihood risk factor disclosures will 
subsequently be deemed adequate is not necessarily causal. We cannot rule out the possibility 
that risk factor disclosures that contain more boilerplate happen to be superior along other 
dimensions not included in our model, and that it is these correlated omitted variables to which 
adjudicators are responding. However, the link between favorable judicial and regulatory 
outcomes and disclosure characteristics the SEC asserts are undesirable provides one possible 





Description of LENGTH measure 
First, we calculate the similarity between all firms in the same two-digit SIC industry and 
identify a firm’s peer as the firm with the most similar 10-K Item 1 Business Description 
disclosure. To measure similarity, we first construct a topic model using Latent Dirichlet 
Allocation with 200 topics over all firms’ Item 1 and calculate the topic probability vector 
for each firm (Dyer et al. 2017). Our similarity metric is in the same spirit as Hoberg and 
Phillips (2016), except that we calculate the cosine similarity score between two firms’ topic 
probability vectors rather than between vectors indicating word presence. The motivation 
for using the LDA topic model relaxes the assumption made by Hoberg and Phillips (2016) 
that each word is it unique topic.  Second, for each firm in our sample, we subtract the 
natural logarithm of the number of words of the most similar peer to obtain a measure of 
abnormal disclosure length. 
Description of NON_SPECIFICITY 
We use Python’s natural language tool kit (NLTK) package (http://www.nltk.org) to implement 
Stanford’s Named Entity Recognition algorithm (Lafferty et al. 2001, Finkel et al. 2005).  This 
algorithm identifies specific references to entities in seven categories: person, organization, 
location, money, date, time, and percent. Hope et al. (2016) explain in detail the implementation 
and assess the construct validity of this measure.   
 
Description of STANDARDIZATION 
We define commonly-used trigrams are those that appear in at least 10% and not more than 
90% of the risk factor disclosures produced by firms in the same SIC 2-digit industry.  
Description of topic model 
We estimate a topic model using a Bayesian machine-learning approach proposed by Blei 
et al. (2003).17 Specifically, we split each risk factor section into paragraphs, remove stop words, 
estimate an LDA topic model with 200 topics, and calculate a topic probability vector (TPV) for 
each risk factor paragraph. We identify the topic for each paragraph as the topic with the highest 
probability and create 200 indicator variables that equal one if the topic was disclosed in that 
                                                 
17 Blei (2012) provides an overview of topic models. Also, prior accounting studies have estimated topic models for 
10-Ks (Dyer et al. 2017), analyst reports (Huang et al. 2016), and risk factor disclosures (Campbell et al. 2014).   
31  
  
firm’s risk factor disclosures, and zero otherwise. To preserve degrees of freedom, we replicate 
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Factors Cited in Judicial and Regulatory Assessments of Risk Factor Disclosure Adequacy 
Panel A: Judicial Assessments of Risk Factor Disclosure Adequacy for Safe Harbor Protections   
Supporting Reasons Cited When Risk Factor Disclosure is Ruled Adequate  
Risk factor language fulfils the statutory requirement to warn investors of risks that could cause actual results to vary. 94 
Risk factor language is specific/detailed/tailored to the firm 57 
Risk factor language included the risk that actually transpired. 56 
Assertion that risk factor language is adequate with no clear supporting explanation.  47 
Risk factor language is extensive/lengthy/numerous 30 
Risk factor language is similar to that found to be adequate by prior courts. 13 
Other 12 
Total 309 
Supporting Reasons Cited when Risk Factor Disclosure is Ruled Inadequate  
Failure to disclose a material risk factor 51 
Failure to disclose important facts made risk factors disclosures misleading 46 
Failure to provide any risk language with the forward-looking statements 35 
Risk factor disclosure was too vague/boilerplate/non-specific 35 




Panel B: SEC Comments Relating to Risk Factor Disclosures  
Increase specificity relating to information already disclosed  84 
Explain further or clarify a risk factor 83 
Add an additional risk factor  57 
Remove qualifying language from risk factors 40 
Change heading or formatting to make content of risk factor more clear   9 
Remove a risk factor  7 
Total  280 
36  
  
Panel A of Table 1 categorizes the factors cited by judges in explaining why a given firm’s risk factor disclosures are deemed adequate or 
inadequate to provide legal protection to a defendant’s forward-looking statements under the safe harbor of the PSLRA. Panel A is based on 409 
unique judicial opinions regarding defendants’ motion to dismiss lawsuits filed between 1996 and 2015. The total factors cited sum to more than 
409 because in some cases the judge cites more than one unique factor. These lawsuits consist of 264 unique cases for which the risk factor 
disclosures were deemed adequate, and 145 unique cases for which the firm’s risk factor disclosures were deemed inadequate. Panel B categorizes 
the SEC comments relating to firms’ risk factor disclosures for a random sample of 200 risk factor related SEC comment letters issued between 
2006 and 2015.  The total issues cited in the SEC comment letters sums to more than 280 because in some comment letters the SEC requests more 
than one change to the risk factor disclosure.
  
TABLE 2  
Sample Selection  
Panel A: Sample of Lawsuits Alleging False or Misleading Forward-Looking Statements   
Securities lawsuits with published judicial opinions retrieved from keyword searches on Lexis Nexis Legal with a 
filing date in 2006 or later 
  328 
Eliminate:   
Lawsuits against firms missing necessary Compustat or CRSP data or for which the CIK could not be found  (78) 
Lawsuits that do not involve forward-looking statements  (37) 
Lawsuits in which the judge does not explicitly rule regarding the adequacy of the firm’s cautionary language  (62) 
Lawsuits missing Item 1A textual analysis data   (7) 
Unique lawsuits examined in post-2005 multivariate regression analyses   144 
 
 
SEC Comment Letters relating to Item 1A Risk Factor Disclosures from Audit Analytics Database (June 2017)         4,450  
Eliminate:  
     
 
             Firm-years for which Item 1A textual analysis variables could not be computed  (1,606) 
 
 




   







SEC Comment Letters relating to Item 1A Risk Factors examined in multivariate regression analyses         1,666   
 TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Firm-Years in Lawsuit Sample (N = 246)  
  
Variable  Mean  Median  Q1  Q3  Std  
LENGTH  0.0917 0.0915 -0.3757 0.4911 0.6612 
NON_SPECIFICITY  -0.4687 -0.2724 -6.5086 5.8015 11.3285 
STANDARDIZATION  0.5460 0.5518 0.4539 0.6421 0.1473 
RET_COR 0.2151 0.2159 0.1247 0.2878 0.1222 
RET_VOL  0.0343 0.0299 0.0223 0.0424 0.0179 
BETA  1.2215 1.1775 0.9057 1.5446 0.4826 
SIZE  7.4862 7.2264 6.3059 8.5297 1.8350 
LEV  0.2299 0.1500 0.0028 0.3620 0.2478 
BIG_N  0.8252 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3806 
SKEW  0.3406 0.2648 -0.3176 0.9282 1.5483 
TURNOVER  0.6031 0.4753 0.2665 0.8551 0.4609 
ETR  0.1824 0.2888 0.0000 0.3702 0.3679 
ROE  -0.0117 0.0430 -0.0326 0.0747 0.1903 
 
            
            
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Firm-Years in SEC Comment Letter Sample (N = 33,725)  
 
Variable  Mean  Median  Q1  Q3  Std  
LENGTH  -0.0267 -0.0067 -0.4747 0.4231 0.7298 
NON_SPECIFICITY  -0.3969 -0.1995 -6.2545 5.5401 10.4461 
STANDARDIZATION  0.5493 0.5576 0.4725 0.6366 0.1334 
RET_COR 0.2259 0.2173 0.1258 0.3203 0.1403 
RET_VOL  0.0314 0.0265 0.0184 0.0385 0.0192 
BETA  1.0426 1.0491 0.6625 1.4030 0.5758 
SIZE  6.2914 6.2730 4.8966 7.6394 1.9964 
LEV  0.2215 0.1552 0.0224 0.3346 0.3656 
BIG_N  0.7145 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4517 
SKEW  0.4469 0.2731 -0.1261 0.7907 1.5538 
TURNOVER  0.5820 0.3822 0.1898 0.6859 1.0851 
ETR  0.1171 0.2700 0.0000 0.3610 11.9401 
ROE  -0.0739 0.0416 -0.0274 0.0717 24.5087 
 
LENGTH is the natural logarithm of the total words in the 10-K Item 1A risk factor disclosure.  
NON_SPECIFICITY is the number of specific entities identified in the firm’s risk factor section 
using the Stanford Named Entity Recognition tool, scaled by the total number of words in Item 
1A and multiplied by -1,000. LENGTH and NON_SPECIFICITY are benchmarked against the 
 firm’s closest industry peer, where closest industry peers are determined as discussed in Section 
4.2. STANDARDIZATION is the number of words in boilerplate sentences in Item 1A scaled by 
the total number of words in Item 1A. Our measure of boilerplate sentences is based on 
commonly used trigrams in risk factor disclosures of other firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry, 
and is described in greater detail in Section 4.2 of the text. RET_COR is the mean correlation 
between firm’s 24-month return ending at the current fiscal year end and the same window return 
for each other firm in its same 2-digit industry. RET_VOL is the standard deviation of daily 
returns for the year ending two days prior to the 10-K filing date. BETA is the firm’s market beta 
measured using daily returns for the one year ending two trading days prior to the 10-K filing 
date. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity.  LEV is total liabilities scaled by 
total assets, measured as of the end of the fiscal year. BIG_N is an indicator variable equal to one 
if the firm is audited by one of the largest auditors (the Big N), and zero otherwise.  
SKEWNEWSS is measured as the negative coefficient of skewness for daily returns over the year 
ending two days prior to the 10-K filing date.  TURNOVER is the mean number of shares traded 
during the fiscal year scaled by the number of common shares outstanding. ETR is the firm’s 
effective tax rate, computed as tax expense scaled by pre-tax income. ROE is income before 
extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity.  
 TABLE 4 
Inadequate Risk Factor Disclosures and the Probability of Lawsuit Dismissal 
 
Dependent Variable 
  DISMISSAL 
 
Parameter Estimate 
Standard Error  
 Model 1  Model 2  
RF_INADEQUATE_JG -1.9931 *** -4.7041 *** 
  0.2520  1.0297  
Risk control variables:   
 
  
RET_COR -0.3569  -0.1630  
 0.9688  2.6787  
RET_VOL 3.0916  -34.0933  
  10.1762  22.2919  
BETA 0.2138  0.9220  
  0.2446  0.7265  
SIZE 0.2687 *** 0.0783  
  0.0740  0.1935  
LEV -0.7639  -0.5730  
  0.5340  1.5982  
BIG_N -0.0386  0.1495  
  0.4045  0.9497  
SKEW 0.1535 * 0.5262 *** 
  0.0824  0.1822  
TURNOVER 0.7542 *** 1.9220 ** 
  0.2889  0.7679  
ETR 0.3259  1.3903  
  0.3159  1.0701  
ROE 0.8553  0.3501  
  0.7946  2.8759  
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  
Circuit fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Area under ROC curve 0.857  0.955  
N 524  237  
Table 4 displays the results of a logistic regression of the probability of a lawsuit dismissal on the indicator 
variable, RF_INADEQUATE_JG, and control variables. RF_INADEQUATE_JG is equal to one for lawsuits in 
which the judge explicitly rules the firm’s risk factor disclosures are inadequate to avail the firm of the PSLRA’s 
safe harbor, and zero if the judge explicitly rules the risk disclosures are adequate. All control variables are defined 
in the notes to Table 3. The sample includes all firm-years that have a 10-K filed within the class period of the 
lawsuit. The first column displays regression results for our entire sample of lawsuits from 1996 to 2015. The 
second column displays results for the post-2005 sample for which we have Item 1A textual data. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the .10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively (two-tailed tests).  
 TABLE 5 
Judicial Assessments of Risk Factor Disclosure Inadequacy  
 
Dependent Variable 
  RF_INADEQUATE_JG 
 
Parameter Estimate 
Standard Error  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 
 
 
LENGTH -0.8383 **  
 
  -1.2118 * 




  0.7298  
NON_SPECIFICITY   -0.0464 **   -0.1527 *** 
    0.0211 
 
  0.0586  
STANDARDIZATION   
 
-2.2763  -1.8447  
        1.905  3.5685  
Risk control variables:          
RETURN_CORRELATION -0.2979  -0.317  -0.3517  1.5849  



















-0.3899  -1.8279 * 









0.0643  -0.2193  




0.1912  0.4025  
LEVERAGE 1.9095 ** 1.9987 ** 1.5598  2.4886  









-0.5556  -2.5447 * 









0.1986  0.1341  









-0.198  0.0292  









-0.1746  0.6334  




0.5894  1.0163  
ROE 5.1202 *** 6.1168 ***
 
4.6931 *** 9.5208 ** 
  1.5186   1.8494   1.5389  4.5805  
Industry fixed effects  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Circuit fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Topic fixed effects No 
 
No  No  Yes  
Area under ROC curve 0.884 
 
0.887  0.880  0.967  
N 246 
 
246  246  246  
Table 5 reports the results from a regression of the probability the sued firm’s risk factor disclosures are 
assessed as inadequate by a judge for purposes safe harbor protection under the PSLRA. These assessments 
 are based on the published judicial opinion supporting the judicial decision whether to grant the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss the securities lawsuit. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 3. Industry 
fixed effects are measured at the Fama/French 12-industry classification level. Topic indicators are included 
based on twenty topics estimated using Latent Dirichlet Allocation over the entire corpus of 10-K Item 1A 
risk factor disclosures over our sample period. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Robust standard errors are used to assess statistical significance, which is denoted by *, **, and 
*** for statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 TABLE 6 
Regulatory Assessments of Risk Factor Disclosure Inadequacy  
Panel A: Full Sample  
 
Dependent Variable 





 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
LENGTH 0.039      -0.0635 
 
  0.0365      0.0419 
 
NON_SPECIFICITY   -0.0041 *   -0.0024 
 
    0.00239    0.00267 
 
STANDARDIZATION     -1.0054 *** -0.8002 *** 
      0.2279  0.2767  
Risk control variables:         
RET_COR -0.1075  -0.1075  -0.0428  0.0297  
 0.2635  0.2635  0.2641  0.276  
RET_VOL 15.1548 *** 15.1449 *** 14.9053 *** 12.2839 *** 
  2.3322  2.332  2.3405  2.4851  
BETA 0.0459  0.0487  0.051  0.0341  
  0.0579  0.0579  0.0579  0.0606  
SIZE 0.2121 *** 0.2119 *** 0.2017 *** 0.1998 *** 
  0.0206  0.0206  0.0207  0.023  
LEV -0.0197  -0.0191  -0.0035  -0.0584  
  0.1034  0.1031  0.1021  0.1197  
BIG_N -0.2448 *** -0.2418 *** -0.2429 *** -0.1607 ** 
  0.0722  0.0722  0.0722  0.0755 
 
SKEW -0.0063  -0.0067  -0.0062  -0.0066 
 
  0.0183  0.0182  0.0183  0.0193 
 
TURNOVER 0.004  0.007  0.0123  -0.0003 
 
  0.0487  0.0485  0.0484  0.0518 
 
ETR -0.0688  -0.0702  -0.0727  -0.0624 
 
  0.0667  0.0667  0.0664  0.068 
 
ROE -0.0691  -0.0688  -0.0631  -0.052 
 
  0.0882  0.0882  0.0876  0.0884   
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Circuit fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Topic fixed effects No  No  No  Yes  
Area under ROC curve 0.713  0.713  0.714  0.741  
N 33,407  33,407  33,407  33,407  
Table 6 Panel A reports the results from a regression of the probability that a firm’s risk factor disclosures are 
targeted by an SEC comment letter during the SEC’s filing review process. Variable definitions are provided in 
 the notes to Table 3. Industry fixed effects are measured at the two-digit SIC classification level. Topic 
indicators are included based on two hundred topics estimated using Latent Dirichlet Allocation over the entire 
corpus of 10-K Item 1A risk factor disclosures over our sample period. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust standard errors are used to assess statistical significance, which is 
denoted by *, **, and *** for statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 TABLE 6 (cont’d)  
Panel B: Sample of Firms Receiving Any SEC Comment Letter During the Year  
 
Dependent Variable 





 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
LENGTH 0.0107      -0.0654  
  0.0387      0.0445  
NON_SPECIFICITY   -0.0049 *   -0.0044  
    0.00253    0.00287  
STANDARDIZATION     -0.9947 *** -0.7498 ** 
      0.2444  0.2971  
Risk control variables:         
RET_COR -0.2114  -0.2146  -0.1506  -0.0634  
 0.274  0.274  0.2749  0.2895  
RET_VOL 11.0152 *** 10.9273 *** 10.6329 *** 8.7197 *** 
  2.5918  2.5915  2.5957  2.8041  
BETA 0.0045  0.0061  0.0114  0.0005  
  0.0631  0.0631  0.0632  0.0665  
SIZE 0.0669 *** 0.0667 *** 0.0561 ** 0.0539 ** 
  0.0217  0.0217  0.0218  0.0245  
LEV -0.1773  -0.1854  -0.1752  -0.2031  
  0.1204  0.1206  0.12  0.1385  
BIG_N -0.1867 ** -0.1856 ** -0.1841 ** -0.1139  
  0.0752  0.075  0.0751  0.0801  
SKEW 0.0151  0.015  0.0156  0.021  
  0.0218  0.0218  0.0218  0.0232  
TURNOVER -0.004  -0.0048  -0.0002  -0.0026  
  0.0512  0.0511  0.0511  0.0553  
ETR -0.0261  -0.0249  -0.0281  -0.0391  
  0.0699  0.0698  0.0695  0.0716  
ROE -0.049  -0.0468  -0.0452  -0.0475  
  0.0938  0.0938  0.0933  0.0946   
Industry fixed effects  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Circuit fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Topic fixed effects No 
 
No  No  Yes  
Area under ROC curve 0.686 
 
0.687  0.688  0.719  
N 14,582 
 
14,582  14,582  14,582  
Table 6 Panel B reports the results from re-estimating the regression from Panel A on only the subset of firms 
that received at least one SEC comment letter relating to any disclosure for the fiscal period. Variable 
 definitions are provided in the notes to Table 3. Industry fixed effects are measured at the two-digit SIC 
classification level. Topic indicators are included based on two hundred topics estimated using Latent Dirichlet  
Allocation over the entire corpus of 10-K Item 1A risk factor disclosures over our sample period. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust standard errors are used to assess 
statistical significance, which is denoted by *, **, and *** for statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively.  
 TABLE 6 (cont’d)  
Panel C: Alternative Measure of SEC Comment Letter Relating to Item 1A Risk Factors   
 
Dependent Variable 





 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
LENGTH 0.038      -0.079  
  0.0703      0.082  
NON_SPECIFICITY   -0.0085 **   -0.0068  
    0.00432    0.00496  
STANDARDIZATION     -1.4583 *** -1.0633 ** 
      0.4312  0.5191  
Risk control variables:         
RET_COR 0.3784  0.3793  0.4786  0.3962  
 0.5097  0.5092  0.5123  0.5459  
RET_VOL 14.2611 *** 14.066 *** 13.8912 ** 11.9407 ** 
  4.2271  4.2353  4.2503  4.6485  
BETA 0.0784  0.0833  0.0867  0.0675  
  0.1121  0.112  0.1118  0.1195  
SIZE 0.2243 *** 0.2226 *** 0.2079 *** 0.2072 *** 
  0.0361  0.0362  0.0363  0.0422  
LEV -0.2928  -0.3015  -0.2765  -0.5177 ** 
  0.2081  0.208  0.2053  0.2565  
BIG_N 0.0706  0.0769  0.082  0.1413  
  0.1472  0.1469  0.1466  0.1569  
SKEW -0.0182  -0.0187  -0.0166  -0.0279  
  0.0383  0.0382  0.0384  0.0422  
TURNOVER 0.0084  0.0124  0.0199  0.0173  
  0.0943  0.0934  0.0925  0.0969  
ETR -0.0359  -0.0341  -0.0406  -0.0578  
  0.1221  0.1224  0.1215  0.1229  
ROE 0.2333  0.2359  0.2436  0.2398  
  0.2157  0.215  0.2119  0.224  
Industry fixed effects  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Circuit fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Topic fixed effects No 
 
No  No  Yes  
Area under ROC curve 0.805  0.806  0.809  0.849  
N 33,407  33,407  33,407  33,407  
 
 
 Table 6 Panel C reports the results from re-estimating the regression reported in Panel A after replacing the 
dependent variable with an alternative indicator of whether the firm received an SEC comment letter relating to 
Item 1A Risk Factors. The alternative dependent variable is equal to one if the firm received an SEC comment 
letter that contained the phrase “Item 1A” relating to that period’s filings, and zero otherwise. Variable 
definitions are provided in the notes to Table 3. Industry fixed effects are measured at the two-digit  
SIC classification level. Topic indicators are included based on two hundred topics estimated using Latent 
Dirichlet Allocation over the entire corpus of 10-K Item 1A risk factor disclosures over our sample period. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust standard errors are used to assess 
statistical significance, which is denoted by *, **, and *** for statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively.  
 TABLE 7 
Robustness of Results to Alternative Measures of  
Standardized Risk Factor Disclosure Language 
 
Dependent Variable 




 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
LENGTH -0.0604  -0.0588  -0.0592  
  0.0418  0.0418  0.0422  
NON_SPECIFICITY -0.0028  -0.0029  -0.004  
  0.00264  0.00264  0.00273  
STANDARDIZATION -1.2935 *** -1.8593 *** 0.0177  
  0.4556  0.5769  0.3953  
Risk control variables:       
RET_COR 0.0118  0.0092  -0.0126  
 0.2761  0.2759  0.2752  
RET_VOL 12.3061 *** 12.3617 *** 12.4049 *** 
  2.4838  2.4839  2.4787  
BETA 0.0354  0.0372  0.0345  
  0.0607  0.0607  0.0606  
SIZE 0.2003 *** 0.2012 *** 0.2029 *** 
  0.023  0.0229  0.0229  
LEV -0.0637  -0.0639  -0.0644  
  0.1201  0.1197  0.1199  
BIG_N -0.1594 ** -0.1614 ** -0.1629 ** 
  0.0756  0.0756  0.0755  
SKEW -0.0065  -0.0067  -0.0067  
  0.0193  0.0193  0.0193  
TURNOVER 0.0007  0.0013  -0.0061  
  0.0518  0.0518  0.0518  
ETR -0.062  -0.0613  -0.0634  
  0.0681  0.0681  0.0682  
ROE -0.0533  -0.0552  -0.0543  
  0.0883  0.0884  0.0885  
Industry fixed effects  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  
Circuit fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  
Topic fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  
Area under ROC curve 0.41  0.741  0.740  
N 33,407  33,407  33,407  
Table 7 displays results from running the regression analysis after remeasuring STANDARDIZATION based 
on alternative cutoffs for identifying boilerplate sentences. In Table 6, this variable defines boilerplate 
sentences as those with at least 10% of all trigrams in the sentence being boilerplate trigrams, where 
 boilerplate trigrams are those appearing in at least 10% of all Item 1A disclosures in the same 2-digit SIC 
industry on average, but not in more than 90% of all industry-peers’ Item 1A disclosures. In Model 1 of Table 
7, we change these cutoffs to 20%, 20%, and 80%, respectively. In Model 2, we change these cutoffs to 25%, 
25%, and 75%, respectively. In Model 3, we remeasure this variable based on market-wide rather than 
industry-specific trigrams based on the original 10%, 10%, and 10% cutoffs. Industry fixed effects are 
measured at the two-digit SIC classification level. Topic indicators are included based on two hundred topics 
estimated using Latent Dirichlet Allocation over the entire corpus of 10-K Item 1A risk factor disclosures over 
our sample period. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust standard 
errors are used to assess statistical significance, which is denoted by *, **, and *** for statistical significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
